l bee very normal.” and so i said, instinctively, ”i'll back you.”
gingrich：我告诉他说：“这是一场真实的、世界范围的、以后将变的非常普遍的金融危机”，而且我还本能地说：“我会支持你的。”
oio rubin urgehe treasury.
mexico was about to default .
字幕：罗伯特鲁宾召集了财政部紧急会议。
墨西哥将要拖欠外债。
robert rubin: it was fasg, because we had mexico, which we really did think was fag default, and we had enormous politis aplishi we o aplish to support mexico, to try to prevent this from happening, and we all k while we believed the program we were reending was right, there was some risk it wouldn't work.
罗伯特鲁宾：这很奇怪，因为有墨西哥——一个我们真的认为正在面临拖欠形势的国家，为了支持墨西哥，为了防止这种情况的发生，我们有重大的政治问题——我们认为需要的问题——要解决，我们都知道，即使当我们相信我们推荐的项目是正确的时候，仍然存在项目出错的风险。
laura tyson: you go in and say to the president: ”here is a big crisis that could happeell you something to do about it. we 't tell you it's going to work. it's very risky, a's extremely unpopular, but we think you should do it anyway.”
laura tyson：你走就进来对总统说：“要发生一个严重的危机，我们能告诉你一些有关的情况，但是我们无法告诉措施是否有效，但风险很大，我们知道这一措施非常不受欢迎，但是我们认为无论如何你都应该这样做。
oio's advisors reended a loao mexico: $50 billion.
字幕：总统咨询人员建议给墨西哥政府提供一项贷款安排：500亿美元
bill ewhere between five and 10 mieo all of this. i say: ”well, this is a no-brainer. we've got to do this. if we don't do this, mexico will ly fail. then the borders will be flooded with illegal immigrants wh and need food and a job. we'll have an enemy on our southern border, people that will remember when they were down and they were ihat] we were not a good neighbor, and we will pay hugely for that. all over the developing world, people who look at us and think that we are smug and riresponsive and don't care about anybody else will have all that ed. if eople e tried in a good d it will reshout the developing world.”
比尔克林顿：大约在5到10分钟之内，我听完了所有这些。我说：“这用不着思考，我们必须这样做，如果不这样做，墨西哥肯定会崩溃，那么边界地区就会充斥着非法移民，他们饱受饥饿之苦，急需食品和工作。在南部边界，我们会有一个敌人，他们会牢记：在他们受难、需要帮助的时候，我们并没有做一个好的邻居。我们会对此付出巨大的代价。在所有的发展中国家，人们将看着我们，认为我们自命不凡、富有但是麻木不仁，而且不关心任何其他人，所有这些都将加深这样的认识。如果我们提供援助，至少人们会知道，我们努力进行了一件善意的事业，这将在发展中国家产生良好的反响。
narrator: the bailout worked. mexico paid back the loan -- early.
旁白：援助计划取得了效果。墨西哥较早偿还了贷款
for some, the i a dangerous pret: proteg big iors from risks they had willingly taken.
对有些人士而言，这种干预是一个危险的先例，保护那些心甘情愿承担风险的大型投资者的利益。
larry liant to the : remember, the people that got bailed n holders of mexi obligations, so in a serying to bail out our ow it sigo banks and other rivestors that the ; they should take the downside.
larry lindsey, 美国总统经济政策助理：记住，被拯救出危机的人是对墨西哥负有义务的外国投资者，所以，在某种意义上，我们是在努力拯救我们的公民。但是，这也向银行和其他富有的投资者发出了一个信号：在当时，美国财政部要实施援救政策。冒这些风险的人应该承担这些风险。因为他们将获得回报，所以他们应该承担逆境造成的损失。
narrator: as the mexi crisis made clear, teology had transformed financial markets: money could literally be moved across borders in seds.
旁白：墨西哥危机使这一点变的很清楚——技术正在改变着金融市场：资金可以在数秒钟之内流出国界。
chapter 8: the global village [6:47]
第八章: 全球村
narrat the 1990s, teology, too, leapt over national borders, spreading erd ideas.
旁白：在20世纪90年代，技术也超越了国界，传播着商业和观念。
da's hard to believe that at the beginning of the 1990s, e-mail was virtually unknown; most people didn't have it. aer it was everywhere, and it would just bee part of people's lives. and so this unietwork is so powerful. the price of telephone calls plummeted. the elephone calls around the world skyrod people are in d e a way that had never happened before.
daniel yergin：现在人们很难相信在20世纪90世纪之初，电子邮件几乎还不被人所知。绝大多数人没有电子邮箱。但10年之后，电子邮件无处不在，成为了人们生活中的一部分。还有，沟通网络也变的非常强大，电话费用急剧降低，全球电话数量大大攀升，人们正在一种前所未有方式联系和交流。
narrator: ihe ernational phone the
旁白：在20年之间，从美国打出的国际长途电话数目从2亿增加到了52亿。
this at&t trol dles 300 million calls each day.
at&t###的控制中心每天处理3亿个电话。
ameris were oftehe developing world without even knowing it. ers g their credit-ce could be routed seamlessly to ters like this one in iors identify themselves ameriames.
美国人常常在和发展中国家进行联系——有时他们自己甚至不知道这一点。消费者查看他们信用卡上的资金数量的时候，数据将通行无阻地传输到设在印度等地的电话中心，在那里，接线员使用自己起的美国名字。
operator, ter, india: good evening. my racy. ho you?
接线员，电话中心，印度：早上好，我的
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